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Abstract
We examine the incentives of regions to unite and separate. Separation allows for greater
in2uence over the nature of political decision making while uni4cation allows regions to exploit
economies of scale in the provision of government. Our paper explores the in2uence of size,
location and the diversity within regions in shaping this trade-o8. We then examine the way
in which alternative political institutions aggregate regional preferences and thereby de4ne the
number of countries.
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1. Introduction
In the period between 1946 and 1997 the number of nations increased from 74 193.
Many of these countries were born out of the decolonization process in Africa and in
the rest of the world. During the same period, we witnessed a move towards greater
integration in Europe, accompanied by lowering of boundaries between countries. In
addition, during this period, more than 20 boundaries between nations were changed,
without creating or eliminating a nation. 1 More recently, referenda have been held
in many countries and these have resulted in substantial changes in boundaries (as in
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales in Great Britain and East Timor in Indonesia).
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1 See The Times Atlas (1993, Plate 8) for a survey map on border changes and changes in sovereignty
since 1945 and Alesina et al. (2000) for more data on country formation since 1870.
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In this paper we develop a framework to examine the incentives of regions to separate
and unite. We then examine the social welfare implications of voting decisions made
on the basis of regional preferences.
Our framework has the following features: there are two regions which can choose
to be independent countries or to unite and form one country. Regional preferences
are derived on the basis of majority voting in each region. If there is disagreement
between the regions then the two regions separate. After the decision on uni4cation and
separation, individuals in each political territory choose the type/location of government
they want to have. This determines, for example, where the capital, the national airport,
the universities and other facilities are located. In this spirit, location choices may
be interpreted geographically. The individuals living close to the capital then have
the highest payo8. The model also permits an interpretation in terms of individual
preferences more generally. 2 We suppose that a country requires a government and
that there is a 4xed cost of this government. This assumption generates a trade-o8:
separation allows individuals within a region to exercise greater in2uence in political
decision-making, while union allows them to exploit economies of scale in the provision
of government. 3
We .rst examine the role of regional size in shaping this trade-o8. Our 4nding is
that uni.cation takes place between similar sized regions (Proposition 3.2). This result
arises out of the di8erent ways in which the political costs of uni4cation compare with
the tax advantages. In particular, political costs of uni4cation vary linearly with the
size of the other region, while the tax advantages are increasing and convex in the size
of the other region. This implies that relative to the costs the gains from uni4cation
increase for the small region as it gets smaller; on the other hand, the gains from
uni4cation decline for the larger region as the small region becomes smaller. Thus
large regions are reluctant to form unions with small regions while small regions are
keen to form unions. One implication of these preferences is that uni4cation only occurs
if costs of government are relatively high and if regions are roughly of the same size.
Moreover, small regions are more in favor of uni4cation as compared to large regions.
We next examine the social welfare implications of decisions made on the basis of
these regional preferences. Our main 4nding is that majority voting leads to excessive
separation from a social point of view (Proposition 3.4). The excessive incentives
arise out of the way the costs and bene4ts of uni4cation are distributed and the ex-
ternalities this generates. The costs of separation in terms of higher per capita tax
rates are borne equally by individuals in a region. On the other hand, the bene-
4ts of separation depend on an individual’s location. Individuals located close to the
2 In the latter interpretation, individuals who are close to each other are assumed to have the same
preferred type of government. Governments located far from an individual di8er more from the preferred
type of government of this individual. The choice of the type of government, for example, can determine
which social security system will prevail. The people who prefer the prevailing social security system have
a higher payo8 than other individuals.
3 This trade-o8 as well as some other features are similar to the model presented in Alesina and Spolaore
(1997). We discuss the relationship of our paper with their work in detail below.
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) present empirical evidence that supports the existence of scale e8ects in the
provision of government.
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boundary between the regions loose relatively more from separation while individuals
away from the boundaries gain more from separation. Thus an individual’s vote on
uni4cation/separation generates externalities on other voters; in particular, our analysis
shows that the voting rule tends to under-represent the interests of the former set of
voters and that this leads to excessive separation. The rest of the paper explores the in-
2uence of di8erent features of the regions and the political institutions on these 4ndings.
We start by examining how diversity within the regions a8ects the basic trade-o8
between uni4cation and separation identi4ed above. Our .rst observation is that given
a size con4guration of the regions, clustering in the large region makes uni4cation
more attractive for the large region but less attractive for the small region. The intu-
ition for this comes from noting that tax bene4ts are independent of distribution, while
the political costs vary with change in location of the government under uni4cation. If
preferences are clustered around the median voter in the large region then government
will not move much under uni4cation. Hence the political cost is modest and the large
region prefers uni4cation. The second observation is that the distribution of prefer-
ences in the smaller region is essentially irrelevant for the trade-o8 between union and
separation (Propositions 4.1–4.3). These 4ndings suggest that individuals in a large
region may be more willing to form a union with small regions if they are themselves
clustered/concentrated, while small regions will be less eager to form a union with a
large region in spite of the tax advantages, if this is the case.
We then examine the strategic role of regional location. We suppose that there are
three regions located on the unit interval. We are able to completely solve the model
for the case where the corner regions are of the same size. In this setting, we 4nd that
irrespective of the sizes of the di>erent regions, the central region’s most preferred
alternative is a union between all three regions. This is because a union delivers tax
advantages while there are no political costs since the regions on the corners are of
equal size and the location of the government remains unchanged under uni4cation.
This preference in combination with the incentives of very small and relatively equal
sized regions to unite (from the basic model) yields us the outcome that the three
regions unite and form one country if the size of the corner regions is very small as
well as when it is relatively large.
One of the main 4ndings in the basic model is that majority voting generates ex-
cessive incentives for separation. We next examine the role of alternative political
arrangements in mitigating this ineKciency. Recall that in the basic model, political
outcomes are based on majority voting in each region followed by separation in case
of disagreement between the regions. We .rst explore the e8ects of this default op-
tion. We now suppose that the outcome in case of disagreement is uni4cation. When
we apply this default outcome, we 4nd that the excessive incentives for separation
persist (Proposition 5.1). 4 It is possible that a nation-wide referendum could be bet-
ter at internalizing the externalities discussed earlier. This motivates an exploration of
a nation-wide referendum. We 4nd, however, that the outcome under a nation-wide
4 IneKcient outcomes under majority voting have also been pointed out in other contexts; see Besley and
Coate (1998) for a general analysis of ineKcient outcomes under majority voting in the context of repeated
elections.
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referendum is the same as in the case where separation only takes place when both
regions agree on separation (Proposition 5.2). Excessive separation thus obtains under
these alternative voting rules as well. If there are only a few individuals in the small
region then the tax burden on these individuals is very heavy. One way out of the out-
come of separation would be for the small region to accept unequal or unconditional
union. Under this arrangement, voters in the large region decide the location or type
of the government, but people in both regions pay for it. We note that under this rule,
a large region is always in favor of union. However, the small region is willing to pay
the political costs only if it is suKciently small. This suggests that unequal union is
likely to take place if the regions are of very di>erent sizes.
We 4nally examine the stability of di8erent political arrangements and their norma-
tive appeal. Our main 4nding is that within the class of majority voting rules inves-
tigated, the voting rule with two referenda (one in each region), supplemented with
union as the default outcome, is stable—in the sense that it is chosen in a vote among
di>erent voting rules—as well as normatively appealing.
Our paper is a contribution to the study of country formation and secession. Inspired
by the recent redrawing of boundaries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
there has been considerable interest in these issues in recent years, see e.g. Alesina and
Spolaore (1997), Bookman (1993), Bolton and Roland (1993), Casella and Feinstein
(1990), Dagan and Volij (2000), Ellingsen (1998) and Wei (1991a, b). 5 In particular,
our paper is closely related to the paper by Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Wei
(1991a, b).
Alesina and Spolaore (1997) study the in2uence of di8erent factors, such as the
level of market integration and democratization, in determining the number and size
of countries. They use the same trade-o8 as we use: the economic advantages of uni-
4cation are compared with the political costs of a government which is located further
away in a larger country. In this setting, they 4nd that democratization leads to an in-
eKciently large number of countries. In their analysis, the boundaries between nations
are endogenous but they restrict attention to outcomes with equal sized countries. By
contrast, in the present paper the focus is on di8erent features of the regions, such
as size, location and their internal diversity in shaping the trade-o8 noted above. We
are particularly interested in the role of initial asymmetries along these dimensions. To
focus on these factors, and to keep the model tractable we assume that the boundaries
of the regions are exogenously speci4ed. 6 The assumption of exogenous boundaries
5 This recent political economy work is related to the local public good literature and the literature on
4scal federalism (Bolton et al., 1996). For the local public good theory, see Austin (1993), Benabou (1993),
Bewley (1981), Epple and Romer (1991), Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001), Rubinfeld (1987), Scotchmer (1996),
Stahl and Varaiya (1983) and Tiebout (1956). For literature on 4scal ferderalism, see Oates (1972), Persson
and Tabellini (2000) and Wildasin (1988).
6 While tractability is the primary motivation for our formulation, it is worth mentioning that in some
cases pre-existing borders do play an important role when interstate borders are redrawn. For instance, when
the Soviet Union broke up, Belarus and Moldavia became independent partly because they already existed as
states within a federal union. Similarly, when Italy uni4ed, decisions on uni4cation were made separately in
the Bologna region and in Tuscany because these regions existed as separate political units. We are grateful
to an anonymous referee for suggesting these examples as a motivation for the assumption of exogenous
boundaries.
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also allows us to examine in detail the impact as well as the stability of alternative
political institutions.
Wei (1991a, b) examines a model in which the size of the regions is exogenously
speci4ed. Moreover, he allows for the level of a public good in a nation to vary
depending on the level of economic development and the size of the nation. The
trade-o8 in his model is between the higher eKciency of the public good under union
and the lower coordination costs under separation. Our analysis di8ers from Wei’s in
that we consider a 4xed-costs public good and this leads to a very di8erent trade-o8:
we compare the eKciency gains in terms of one as against two governments with the
political costs of greater distance to the government. In addition, we also study the
nature of socially desirable outcomes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic model. Section
3 presents the outcomes under majority voting as well the socially optimal outcomes.
Section 4 examines diversity within regions and the strategic role of regional location,
while Section 5 explores the impact of alternative political arrangements. Section 6
concludes.
2. The basic model
We suppose that one public good identi4es a nation (i.e. a country); we call this
public good the ‘government’. The range of all possible governments is normalized in
the segment [0; 1]. The location of a government is denoted by l. In addition, we assume
that the total population has mass one and that individuals from this population are
located at ideal points, which indicates their preferred government. The individuals are
uniformly distributed on the segment [0; 1]. The utility of each individual is decreasing
with the distance from his government to his location (i.e. his ideal point). The distance
between the ideal point of a consumer i and the government in his country is denoted
by di.
We assume that there are two regions with a 4xed (exogenous) boundary . The
region located on the left-hand side of  is called region A, while the region on
the right-hand side of  is called region B. We suppose that 0¡¡ 12 . We assume
that there is a 4xed cost F per country, regardless of its size. 7 This F includes for
example the costs of building airports and hospitals and the costs of having a machinery
of government. In the basic model every individual has the same, exogenous income
y, and pays the lump-sum tax ti. 8 Now, we can de4ne the utility function for each
7 When the costs of a government depends on the size of the country, we could model the costs as
F = f + s where s denotes the size of the country. We conjecture that, as long as f is positive, our main
results will carry over.
8 Proportional taxation with di8erent tax levels across regions is not sustainable when the subject of
taxation (e.g. capital or labor) is mobile in a union. In the model with exogenous income levels which are
equal across the regions lump-sum taxation is equivalent to proportional taxation. We assume that individual
wealth is equal in the two regions. We examine the case of unequal wealth across regions in Appendix B.
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individual i as follows:
U (i) = g(1− adi) + y − ti; (1)
where g and a are two positive parameters. The parameter g measures the utility of
the public good when the preference distance di is zero and the parameter a measures
the loss in utility if the government is farther away (i.e. when di increases). The
utility function is thus linear in the preference distance. We assume that a¡ 1, which
ensures that a higher g increases utility. The parameter a can then be interpreted as the
marginal utility of a government located at a distance di. We look at the incentives for
separation and uni4cation under majority voting and we assume that separation occurs
if a majority of voters is in favor of separation in at least one region.
3. Regional incentives and the social optimum
In this section we will 4rst examine the outcomes when decision to form one or
two countries is taken by majority voting and then we will derive the socially optimal
number of countries.
Majority voting: We 4rst observe that if  is very small then the per capita cost of
supporting an independent government, F=, becomes very large and the individuals in
region A will bene4t signi4cantly from uni4cation. Hence small regions will typically
prefer to have a union. The individuals in region B also compare the bene4t of a
lower tax rate under uni4cation with the disadvantage of a change in the location of
the public good under uni4cation. This comparison depends in turn on how political
costs and the tax advantage varies as the size of regions varies. Our analysis of these
issues is summarized in Proposition 3.1. We de4ne A = 2F=ga and B = 1− 2F=ga.
Proposition 3.1. Region A prefers uni.cation if and only if ¡A while region B
prefers uni.cation if and only if ¿B. Thus uni.cation only takes place if B ¡A
and ∈ [B; A].
We 4rst observe that the preferences of the person in the center of a region re2ect
the majority opinions in each region: In a region, there is a majority in favor of
separation if and only if the median voter in that region prefers separation. This is
a direct implication of the median voter theorem. 9 The incentives for uni4cation and
separation can therefore be derived by comparing the payo8s of the median voter in
each of these cases. These computations are now presented. Let UI(i) be the utility of
voter i under uni4cation, and let UII(i) be his utility under separation.
9 In our setting, preferences over the location of the public good are single-peaked and the policy space is
single-dimensional. It follows that in case of separation the public good will be located at the mid-point of the
region, while in case of uni4cation, the public good will be located at the point 12 . It is now straightforward
to check that if the median voter (say) in region A (who is located at =2) prefers separation then all voters
in the interval [0; =2] will prefer separation. Likewise, if the median voter prefers uni4cation then all voters
in the interval [=2; ] will prefer uni4cation.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. There will be a majority in favor of uni4cation in region A
if the median voter =2 prefers uni4cation:
UII
(
2
)
= g+ y − F

¡g
(
1− a
∣∣∣∣12 − 2
∣∣∣∣
)
+ y − F = UI
(
2
)
: (2)
That is, if
¡
2F
ga
= A: (3)
There is a majority in favor of uni4cation in region B if the median voter (1 + )=2
prefers uni4cation:
UII
(
1 + 
2
)
= g+ y − F
1−  ¡g
(
1− a 
2
)
+ y − F = UI
(
1 + 
2
)
: (4)
That is, if
¿ 1− 2F
ga
= 1− A = B: (5)
This completes the proof.
Our interest is in the relationship between the size of a region and the incentives
for uni4cation and separation. The incentives for uni4cation depend on the magnitude
of the tax advantage as against the costs of political distance. The above computations
show that the two e8ects—the political costs and the tax advantages of uni4cation—do
not in2uence utility in the same way. In particular, the tax advantage from uni4cation
is F= − F for Region A, and F=(1 − ) − F for Region B. It follows that the tax
advantage from uni4cation for region B is increasing and convex in the size of region
A. Fig. 1 illustrates this aspect of the trade-o8.
This 4gure allows us to derive the outcomes under majority voting. We summarize
them in the following result.
Proposition 3.2. The outcomes under majority voting are given as follows: (a) If
F ¡ga=4 then the regions remain independent for all ∈ [0; 12 ], (b) if ga=4¡F¡ga=2
then there is uni.cation if and only if ∈ [B; 12 ], and (c) if ga=2¡F then there is
uni.cation for all ∈ [0; 12 ].
This Proposition says that if costs of having a government are very small or very
large then the political outcomes are independent of the size of the two regions: in
case they are very small the regions remain independent, while if costs of having a
government are large they form a union. The role of size surfaces if the costs of having
a government are at an intermediate level, where ga=4¡F¡ga=2, since in this case
union occurs for ∈ [1 − 2F=ga; 12 ]. Note that the expression 1 − 2F=ga is decreasing
with respect to F . A rise in the costs of having a government will therefore make
uni4cation more likely. If the maximum bene4t from the government, g, increases then
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Region B
F<ga/4
Region A
ga/4<F<ga/2
ga/2
ga/4
Region B
ga/4<F<ga/2
Region B
F>ga/2
Region A
F<ga/4
ga/4
1/2
ga/2
F
union separation
F/α - F
ga/2 - gaα/2
F,g
ga/4
ga/2
1/2
F
separation
F/(1-α) - F
gaα/2
F,g
ga/4
1/2
ga/2
F
union
F,g
F/α - F
ga/2 - gaα/2
ga/4
1/2
F
separation union
F,g
ga/2
F/(1-α) - F
gaα/2
Region A
F>ga/2
1/2
ga/2 - gaα/2
F/α - FF
union
F,g
ga/4
1/2
F
gaα/2
F/(1-α) - F
union
F,g
ga/2
α
α
α
α
α
α
Fig. 1. Majority voting outcomes.
1 − 2F=ga will also increase and uni4cation becomes less likely. The same holds for
an increase in the preference intensity a.
The social optimum: It is socially optimal to have two independent nations when
the gain due to lower political costs outweigh the additional costs of having two
governments. It is therefore only socially optimal to have two independent nations when
the 4xed costs of the public good are low. If the small region is very small, then there
will be only a few individuals in the small region which will bene4t from a separate
government. It is therefore only socially optimal to have two independent nations if
the two regions are both of reasonable size. These considerations are summarized in
the next proposition. Let FSP = ga=8 and SP = 12 −
√
1
4 − 2F=ga.
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0 1/2
union under majority voting
union in the social planner’s solution
1/2
no union under 
majority voting
union in the social planner’s solution
union under 
majority voting
αB0
1/2
no union under majority voting
union in the social planner’s solution
αA0 1/2
no union under majority voting
union in the social
planner’s solution
αA αSP
no union in the social
planner’s solution
0
(a)
(c)
(b)
(d)
Fig. 2. Majority voting and social optima. (a) F ¿ga=2; (b) ga=4¡F¡ga=2; (c) ga=8¡F¡ga=4; (d)
F ¡ga=8.
Proposition 3.3. If F ¡FSP then union is optimal if and only if ¡SP. If F ¿FSP
then union is the unique optimal outcome.
The computations are provided in Appendix A. We now turn to a comparison be-
tween the outcomes under majority voting and the socially optimal outcomes.
Majority voting and social optimum compared: A comparison of the outcomes under
majority voting and the social optima reveals:
Proposition 3.4. (i) If F ¡ga=8 then uni.cation is socially optimal for all ∈ [0; 12 −√
1
4 − 2F=ga] but separation obtains under majority voting for all ∈ [0; 12 ], (ii) if
ga=8¡F¡ga=4 then uni.cation is socially optimal for all ∈ [0; 12 ] but separation
obtains under majority voting for all ∈ [0; 12 ], (iii) if ga=4¡F¡ga=2 then uni.ca-
tion is socially optimal for all ∈ [0; 12 ] but separation obtains under majority voting
for all ∈ [0; 1− 2F=ga], and (iv) if F ¿ga=2 then union is socially optimal as well
as the majority voting outcome for all ∈ [0; 12 ].
These results are illustrated in Fig. 2. 10 The main 4nding of the above result is
that there exist excessive incentives for separation under majority voting: for certain
parameter values majority voting obtains separation but the socially optimal solution is
uni4cation. We now elaborate on the sources of this ineKciency.
The excessive incentives arise out of the way the costs and bene4ts of uni4cation are
distributed and the externalities this generates. The costs of separation, F=−F for the
small region and F=(1−)−F for the large region, are borne equally by the individuals
10 Note that F ¡ga=8 implies 2F=ga¡ 12 −
√
1
4 − 2F=ga and 1 − 2F=ga¿ 12 −
√
1
4 − 2F=ga (and thus
2F=ga¿ 1 − 2F=ga), that F ¿ga=4 implies 1 − 2F=ga¡ 2Fga and that F ¿ga=2 implies that 2F=ga¿ 1
and 1− 2F=ga¡ 0 (and thus 1− 2F=ga¡ 2F=ga).
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in each region because of the lump-sum taxation system. On the other hand, the bene4ts
of separation to an individual depend on this location. The individuals located close
to the boundary between the regions will loose the most from separation, and in both
regions the individuals away from the boundary gain the most from separation. The
aggregate increase in the payo8 of these individuals (located towards the corners),
however, is less than the aggregate decrease in the payo8 of the individuals located
close to the boundary between the two regions.
The analysis of the basic model yields us two principal insights. Firstly, that the
large region typically is less keen on uni4cation as compared to the small region.
This result is due to the fact that the tax advantages from uni4cation are increasing
and convex in the size of the other region, while the political costs are linear. Thus
a union with a very small region fails to generate adequate tax advantages for the
large region (in the interesting class of parameters). Secondly, we 4nd that outcomes
under majority voting typically lead to too much separation as compared to what is
socially optimal. This is due the fact that whereas the tax advantages of uni4cation are
shared evenly by voters in a region, the political costs are unevenly distributed and
this generates externalities which lead to ineKcient outcomes. We will now discuss the
empirical and normative implications of our 4ndings.
Relation with empirical patterns: The main prediction of the basic model is that uni-
4cation will only take place between similar sized regions and that there are situations
in which a small region prefers uni4cation while a large region is averse to uni4cation
and hence no uni4cation takes place. How does this prediction square with empirical
observation? Our observations pertain to uni4cation among unequal sized regions. The
.rst remark is that in many instances large regions are relatively more interested in
uni4cation as compared to small regions. One manifestation of this is the desire of
regions to secede or seek greater autonomy from large countries, who in turn resist
these attempts (examples of this include Kashmir and Assam from India, and Chechnya
from Russia). This seems to go against the prediction of the model and motivates a
closer examination of the assumptions of our model. One way to proceed is to allow
a region to choose between independence, union with one country or union with the
other country. It is possible, for example, to think of Northern Ireland as a part of
Ireland or as a part of the United Kingdom, as it (still) is at present. It is unlikely,
however, that Ireland and the United Kingdom will form a union. Another example is
South Tirol (between Italy and Austria; in Italy this region is now part of Trentino Alto
Adige). In Section 4 below we will explore the role of the distribution of preferences
and the strategic role of regional location in shaping incentives for uni4cation and
secession. Our second observation pertains to the phenomenon of unequal union—a
situation in which a small region contributes to the public good but has virtually no
say in the policy making. There are several instances of this arrangement; for example,
the Dutch central bank used to base its monetary policy on the German Bundesbank;
presumably the costs of running an independent policy were too high. Other examples
include small countries like Luxembourg being essentially passive members of NATO,
Liechtenstein participating in a customs union with Switzerland, using the Swiss Francs
as its national currency, and Puerto Rico whose citizens do not vote in the US
presidential elections. Our 4nding that there are situations in which small regions may
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want union while large regions are averse to union provides an explanation for why
such unequal union arise. We explore the scope of unequal union formally in Section
5 below. A last remark concerns wealth di8erences. It is widely argued that wealth
and income di8erences are one of the main factors behind regional movements which
seek secession. Some examples of this are Belgium (between Flanders and Wallonia),
Italy (between north and south Italy), Catalonia (vis-Ta-vis the rest of Spain) and Nor-
way (vis-Ta-vis the European Union). Our analysis of wealth di8erences is presented in
Appendix B.
Normative aspects: Our results suggest that using majority voting in each region to
make decisions on uni4cation and separation may lead to socially suboptimal outcomes.
This 4nding leads us to investigate alternative voting mechanisms. In the basic model
the default outcome in case of disagreement between regions is separation; this outcome
is realistic when in an initially uni4ed nation, the central government is too weak or
does not want to prevent secession through military means. An instance of this is
the disintegration of the Soviet Union; it is arguable that parts of the country such
as Russia did not favor secession, but it took place nonetheless because the central
government could not prevent other regions from seceding. This voting rule is also
relevant when two initially independent nations are considering political integration. In
many cases, however, these conditions may not hold. There may, for example, exist an
authoritarian regime in an initially uni4ed nation which can stop secession supported
by just one region but which cannot stop secession supported by both regions. In some
institutional settings, democratic approvals of secessions require separate majorities
in each region. For example, Aruba, an island in the Caribbean Sea is still a part
of the Netherlands. The Dutch constitution allows changes in the status of Aruba
if the governments of Aruba and the Netherlands both agree. Although there was
at least a wish by Dutch politicians for an independent Aruba, this was blocked by
the island. Alternatively a regime in an initially uni4ed nation may want to prevent
secession because secession may mean a loss of prestige or lower tax revenues. These
considerations motivate the examination of a default rule that if the preferences of
the two regions di8er then the outcome is union. The 4nal decision rule we consider
is a nation-wide referendum. This rule is motivated by examples of countries where
the parliament decides on the borders of individual states as well as on whether a
region can be allowed to secede. If the parliament is elected in a nation-wide election,
then we may interpret a national parliament deciding on the break up of a nation as
analogous to a nation-wide referendum. An example of this is the vote on the break
up of Czechoslovakia in the parliament. 11 The analysis of alternative rules and their
stability is presented in Section 5.
11 In fact, in the Czechoslovakia example there were three votes on the separation agreement: one in the
Czech part, one in the Slovak part, and a third one in the Czechoslovakian parliament. In all votings there
was a majority in favor of separation. Proposition 5.2 below may be interpreted as saying that either the
vote in the Czechoslovakian parliament or the two votes in the Czech and the Slovak parliaments were
super2uous.
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4. The role of diversity and location
4.1. Diversity
One of the assumptions in the basic model is that the individuals are uniformly
distributed over the unit interval. In general, populations are not uniformly distributed
over regions and the preferences of individuals are typically clustered. This motivates
the examination of the role of concentration of preferences. We note that an explicit
model of clustering/concentration also allows us to distinguish between the in2uence
of the size of a region and the diversity within the region.
We start with an examination of the incentives of the large region. The boundary
between the two regions is at  and an  proportion of the individuals is in region A
and the remaining (1 − ) proportion of the individuals is in region B, as before. To
keep matters simple, we shall suppose that individuals are uniformly distributed over
the interval [(1 + )=2 − b=2; (1 + )=2 + b=2], with b¡ 1 − . When b is small, we
have a high clustering/concentration of preferences, while for large b we approximate
the case of uniform distribution.
If b=0, then all voters in region B are identical and located at the middle of region
B, which is then also the location of the median voter. If ¡ 12 , then it follows that the
public good will be located at (1 + )=2, both in case of separation as well as in case
of uni4cation. Thus there are no political costs and de4nite tax advantages from union
for the large region and that therefore it will always prefer uni4cation. We note that
this preference is independent of the location of the median voter in the small region.
The following result elaborates on the incentives of the large region more generally.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that b¡ 1−. Then there exists a cut-o> cost of the public
good FB(b) such that a majority of the individuals in the large region prefers uni.-
cation if and only if F ¿FB(b). Moreover, FB(b) = 0 at b= 0 and FB(b) is strictly
increasing with respect to b. These preferences are independent of the distribution of
preferences in the small region.
Proof. For a 4xed , the median voter compares the tax bene4t with the political
costs of uni4cation. The tax bene4t F=(1− )−F is independent of the distribution of
individuals. The political cost of uni4cation, however, depends on the distribution of
individuals in the large region. Under separation, the public good is located at (1+)=2.
Under uni4cation, the public good will be located at
1 + 
2
− b
1− 

2
: (6)
Hence the political costs of uni4cation are given by
b
1− 

2
ga: (7)
The median voter in the large region therefore prefers uni4cation if
F ¿
gab
2
= FB(b): (8)
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Note that FB(b) is increasing in b and is equal to 0 at b= 0. The result follows upon
noting that the computations are valid for any distribution of preferences in the small
region, given a value of ¡ 12 .
We now study how the incentives for uni4cation and separation in the smaller region
depend on the distribution of preferences.
Proposition 4.2. Fix a location of the median voter in the small region. Preferences
over uni.cation and separation in region A are independent of the distribution of
preferences in that region.
Proof. The tax bene4t F − F= of uni4cation does not depend on the distribution of
the individuals in the smaller region. Given the assumption on the size of the regions,
that ¡ 12 , the public good will always be located in the larger region. Moreover, the
precise location of the public good will depend only on the distribution of individuals
in the larger region and is independent of the distribution of individuals in the smaller
region. For a 4xed  and a given median voter, it follows that both the tax bene4t
as well as the political cost of union for an individual in the small region does not
depend on the distribution of the individuals in the small region. The preferences over
uni4cation and separation in region A are therefore insensitive to the distribution of
the individuals in region A.
We next examine the impact of preference distribution in the large region on the
incentives for uni4cation and separation in the small region. Recall that b is a measure
of diversity of preferences in the large region.
Proposition 4.3. Let the median voter in the small region be located at =2. There
exists a cut-o> cost of the public good, FA(b), such that a majority of the individuals
in the small region prefers uni.cation if and only if F ¿FA(b). Moreover, FA(b) is
strictly decreasing in b.
Proof. We examine the preference of the median voter in the small region. The utility
from separation is given by
UI
(
2
)
= g+ y − F

: (9)
Under uni4cation, the public good is located at (1+ )=2− b=2(1− ). The payo8 in
a union is therefore given by
UII
(
2
)
= g(1− a|D|) + y − F; (10)
where D = 12 − b=2(1 − ). Thus, the median voter in the smaller region prefers
separation over uni4cation if
F ¿

2(1− )2 [1− − b]ga= FA(b): (11)
Note that FA(b) is decreasing in b.
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Remark. The qualitative properties of FA(b) hold for any location of the median voter;
the assumption that the median voter is located at =2 is used to compute the speci4c
function FA(b).
Propositions 4.1–4.3 clarify the in2uence of the distribution of preferences on the
essential trade-o8 identi4ed earlier. We 4nd that the distribution in the large region
is very important while the distribution in the small region is essentially irrelevant.
Greater diversity in the large region makes uni4cation more attractive for the small
region, while greater concentration (lesser diversity) makes uni4cation more attractive
for the larger region. The intuition behind this is that the greater the diversity in
the large region, the greater the in2uence of the small region on the location of the
government after uni4cation; correspondingly, the greater this in2uence the greater the
political cost for the large region and the smaller the political cost for the small region.
This illuminates an interesting point: small regions prefer to unite with diverse large
regions, while large regions are more in favor of uni4cation if they are less diverse
themselves. Our 4ndings are consistent with the stylized fact that democratization leads
to greater secession and break-up in countries. This is because democratization takes
diversity more into account and this can lower the incentives for uni4cation in the
large region.
4.2. The strategic role of regional location
In the basic model, we have assumed that there are only two regions and that the
boundary between the two regions is 4xed. This section will examine the implications
of relaxing these assumptions. We suppose that there are three regions located on the
unit interval: region A is located on the left hand corner, region B is located on the
right hand corner, while region C is located in the center.
4.2.1. Symmetric case
We will 4rst examine the nature of the majority voting outcome in the setting where
regions A and B are of equal size. Our 4rst observation concerns the preferences of
the central region: this region always prefers uni4cation of the three regions due to
the fact that in a union with the other two regions the location of the public good
will be the same as when region C remains independent. The tax rate, however, will
be lower in a union, making region C strictly better o8. The two regions at the ends
of the interval, A and B, by contrast prefer to be independent if the 4xed costs of a
public good are low. We therefore have to specify what happens when the preferences
of the majority in the di8erent regions are di8erent.
We will look at majority voting outcomes which have the core property: there does
not exist a union of regions which is preferred over the current majority voting outcome
by a majority of the individuals in each of the regions of the union. The boundary
between region A and region C is 4xed at . In the symmetric case the boundary
between region B and region C is therefore 4xed at the value 1 − . The formal
analysis of core outcomes is given in Appendix A. We now discuss the 4ndings and
clarify the connections with the 4ndings in the basic model.
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First, we 4nd that given a value of F , there is a cut-o8 level ˆ such that for all
¡ ˆ, the unique stable outcome is the union of all the three regions. This outcome
appears to di8er from the outcome we observed in the basic model. Recall that in that
model, uni4cation occurs only if F ¿ga=4 and even then it occurs only if the regions
are of relatively equal size, i.e., for large . The principal reason for this change in
outcome is the change in the preferences of the large region. In the three regions model,
the central region’s most preferred outcome, independently of its size and the value of
F , is the union between three regions. In the two regions case, by contrast, the large
region prefers union only with a relatively large region. This contrast illustrates the
importance of location in shaping regional preferences between union and separation.
Second, we 4nd that if F ¿ga=4 then there exists some ˆ such that ∈ ( V; 12 ),
the unique outcome is the union of all the three regions. The reasoning behind this
outcome is as follows: the central region C always prefers such a union, while regions
A and B prefer such a union due to cost-sharing reasons. This is analogous to the
intuition behind the result obtained in the basic model that relatively equal regions
prefer uni4cation.
Our third 4nding pertains to the relation between  and the pattern of union and
separation. In the three regions case, we 4nd that union occurs for very small as well
as for very large , but generally there is either independence or a union of only two
of the regions for intermediate values of . The precise outcome depends on the value
of F , with the three independent regions outcome being stable for low F and the union
between two regions being stable for intermediate F .
Finally, we 4nd that for 4xed , raising F typically increases the level of integration
in the majority outcome. This is intuitive and also in line with our 4ndings for the
basic model.
4.2.2. Central region incentives
In the previous part of this section we assumed that the regions A and B were
of equal size. This assumption allowed a complete characterization of the outcomes
under majority voting. We would also like to explore the case where the two regions
are of unequal size. This is the aim of the present section. There are several sub-
cases involved here and we have been unable to solve the model completely. We shall
therefore focus on the incentives of the central region, which is denoted throughout as
region C. This region has the choice of joining region A or region B, or of remaining
independent. This setup is realistic in cases where we have three regions and where
two of the three di8er too much to form a union but where the third region is in a
position where it can join either of the two regions. Moreover the two regions are in
principle willing to have a union with the central region.
We consider a special case to obtain insights into the issues involved. We 4x the
boundary between regions A and region C at 110 , and vary the boundary between region
C and region B. Region C, in the centre, will prefer to be independent if the costs
F are low. For large F , region C will prefer a union with the largest of the two
other regions. In this case it is important to share the 4xed costs of the public good
with as many individuals as possible. For intermediate values of F , matters are more
complicated. If region C is small then it prefers to join the larger region, while if it
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is itself large then it prefers union with the smaller of the two other regions. When a
region is small it is important to share the 4xed costs of the public good with more
individuals but when a region is not too small the political costs of uni4cation become
more important and the region might prefer to join with a smaller region or it might
prefer independence. A formal statement of these 4ndings (along with the proof) is
provided in Appendix A.
5. Alternative political institutions
In the basic model we assumed that uni4cation occurs if a majority in each of
the regions prefers uni4cation. In this section we examine the robustness of the main
4ndings under alternative political arrangements. We .rst consider the role of the
default outcome, i.e. the rule that speci4es what happens when the majority voting
outcomes in the two regions are di8erent. Second, we explore the nature of majority
voting outcomes under one nation-wide referendum. Third, we examine the e8ects
of unequal union: this is an outcome in which one region gives up the in2uence on
the location of the government. Finally, we examine the endogenous determination of
di8erent voting rules.
5.1. The default outcome
In the basic model, we apply the following majority voting rule. In each region a
referendum is organized over uni4cation and separation. If there exists a majority in
favor of uni4cation in both regions then union takes place; otherwise, the regions remain
separate and form two countries. In this section we consider the following alternative
majority voting rule: In each region a referendum is organized over uni.cation and
separation. If there is a majority in favor of separation in both regions then separation
takes place; otherwise the two regions remain united. Under majority voting a default
outcome speci4es what happens if the regions do not agree. For the majority voting
rule used in the basic model the default outcome is separation. For the majority voting
rule we will now use, the default outcome is uni4cation.
We start by observing that socially optimal outcomes do not change with a change
in default outcome rules: The socially optimal solution is independent of the default
outcome. Hence, the socially optimal solution in the model with union as default
option is the same as the socially optimal solution in the model with separation as
the default outcome. The intuition behind this is straightforward. In the social optimal
solution the decision on uni4cation and separation is taken by maximizing total utility
and not by considering a possible di8erence in preference of majorities in each region.
We next note that the conditions on  for a region to prefer uni4cation are the same
as in the basic model and therefore identical to those identi4ed in Proposition 3.1.
In fact a useful reformulation of Proposition 3.1 is: There exists an A such that a
majority in region A prefers separation if and only if ¿A and there exists an B
such that region B prefers separation if and only of ¡B. In the proof of Proposition
3.1 we determine the conditions on  by comparing the payo8s of the median voter
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Fig. 3. Union as default option. (a) F ¿ga=2; (b) ga=4¡F¡ga=2; (c) ga=8¡F¡ga=4; (d) F ¡ga=8.
under uni4cation and under separation. Using the new majority voting rule neither the
median voter nor his utilities are changed, so the conditions on  will also be the same.
Since we have changed the default outcome from separation to uni4cation, we require
a majority in favor of separation in both regions for separation to occur. Using the
majority voting rule with uni4cation as default outcome and using Propositions 3.1–
3.3, it is easy to derive Fig. 3. In the next result we provide the exact conditions
for uni4cation and separation under majority voting as well as the nature of socially
optimal outcomes.
Proposition 5.1. (a) If F ¡ga=8 then uni.cation is socially optimal for all ∈ [0; 12−√
1
4 − 2F=ga] but separation obtains under majority voting for all ∈ [2F=ga; 12 ], (b)
if ga=8¡F¡ga=4 then uni.cation is socially optimal for all ∈ [0; 12 ] but sepa-
ration obtains under majority voting for all ∈ [2F=ga; 12 ] and (c) if F ¿ga=4 then
uni.cation is socially optimal as well as the majority voting outcome for all ∈ [0; 12 ].
When the default outcome is changed from separation into uni4cation we expect that
union becomes more likely. Indeed, uni4cation is now the majority voting outcome in
more cases. However, even in this setting, there are parameter ranges where the majority
voting outcome is separation, while the socially optimal outcome is uni4cation. This
highlights the robustness of the 4nding concerning the ineKciencies of the majority
rule, obtained in the basic model.
5.2. One nation-wide referendum
In the majority voting rules we have studied so far separate referenda are organized
in each region. We observed that these rules generate excessive incentives for separa-
tion. This motivates an examination of a more inclusive political rule: a nation-wide
referendum. We note that if separate referenda are held in each of the regions, then it
is possible that the results of these referenda are not the same. It is therefore necessary
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to specify a default outcome which de4nes what happens in that case. When there is
a nation-wide referendum, there is no need to specify a default outcome.
The following result derives the conditions under which separation is supported in
a nation-wide referendum.
Proposition 5.2. There exists a majority in favor of separation in the whole nation
if and only if there exists a majority in each region in favor of separation.
The proof is given in Appendix A. This result is somewhat surprising and so we
elaborate on the arguments underlying the proof. First note that the individual located
at 12 always prefers uni4cation over separation. This follows from the fact that there are
tax-advantages of uni4cation as well as lower political costs, since the government is
located at 12 in a union. The second observation pertains to the linearity of the political
costs. If one of the regions prefers uni4cation, then it follows that the median voter
in that region prefers uni4cation over separation. The linearity of the political costs
under both uni4cation and separation implies that all the voters between the median
voter (say) =2 and the end-point 0, also prefer uni4cation. Moreover, it is obvious
that if the median voter prefers uni4cation then so do all voters located between =2
and , since they have a similar tax burden but lower political costs of uni4cation.
Finally, the linearity of the political cost for voters between  and 12 along with the fact
that the voter at 12 prefers uni4cation always implies that they too prefer uni4cation
over separation. We have therefore shown that all voters in the interval [0; 12 ] prefer
uni4cation. The argument now follows from the continuity of the utility function, with
respect to location.
Proposition 5.2 says that if majorities in both regions prefer separation there will
be two separate countries and in all other cases, the outcome will be union with a
single country. This is exactly the outcome we observed under the majority voting rule
with two referenda and uni4cation as the default outcome. Proposition 5.1 therefore
also holds when we apply the voting rule with one nation-wide referendum and the
outcomes are as illustrated in Fig. 3. The result on excessive incentives for separation
thus also holds when a nation-wide referendum is held to decide on uni4cation and
separation.
5.3. Unequal political union
From the analysis of the basic model it follows that the smaller region (region A)
prefers uni4cation if  is small but the large region (region B) prefers separation in
this case. In case  is small, the gain in terms of a lower tax rate is outweighed by
the loss in terms of political relocation of the government. However, for region A
the per capita cost of government becomes too big for small . Therefore, it may be
attractive for region A to ask region B for uni4cation even if the location of the public
good is determined solely by region B. We call this unequal or unconditional union.
In this political arrangement, region A gives up its political in2uence in the hope of a
signi4cant tax reduction.
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We begin by noting that the larger region, Region B, will always accept unequal
union: the individuals in region B will then have higher utility since there is reduction
in the tax rates while there is no loss of political in2uence. In cases where region B
prefers equal union over separation and region A is willing to accept an unequal union
there arises a bargaining problem. To keep matters simple we will assume that in such
cases equal union will take place. Given this assumption, we 4nd that the outcomes
are as follows. De4ne uu = 2F=(ga+ 2F); A and B are de4ned as before.
Proposition 5.3. The outcomes under majority voting supplemented with the option
of unequal union are as follows: (a) If F ¡ga=4 then there is unequal union for
∈ [0; uu] and separation otherwise, (b) if ga=4¡F¡ga=2 then there is unequal
union if [0;min{uu ; B}], separation if ∈ [min{uu ; B}; B] and equal union if
∈ [B; 12 ], and (c) if ga=2¡F then there is equal union for all ∈ [0; 12 ].
Proof. We 4rst note an implication of the median voter theorem: In region A there is a
majority in favor of unequal union against the alternative of separation if the individual
in the centre of region A is in favor of unequal union. Clearly, everyone in region A
prefers equal union over unequal union. A majority in region A favours unequal union
over separation if individual =2 prefers uneqaul union:
Uuu
(
2
)
= g− ga
2
+ y − F ¿g+ y − F

= UII
(
2
)
: (12)
That is, if
¡
2F
ga+ 2F
= uu : (13)
Thus region A prefers unequal union over separation if and only if ¡uu, where
uu = 2F=(ga+ 2F). We can now use Propositions 3.1–3.2 to complete the proof.
From the above result it is clear that for some cases, such as when ∈ [0; uu],
unequal union is preferred over separation by the smaller region. Unequal union thus
softens the negative consequences of excessive separation under majority voting. As
one might expect, there will be unequal union if and only if there is a large di8erence
in size between the regions.
We note that the nature of eKcient outcomes remains the same: the socially optimal
solution in the model extended with unequal union is the same as the socially opti-
mal solution in the basic model. This is because in our computations of the socially
optimal solution we allowed for arbitrary locations of the public good. A comparison
of outcomes under majority voting and the socially optimal outcome is presented in
Fig. 4. 12
5.4. Endogenous political institutions
So far we have considered a number of political institutions. We have found that the
rules under which voting is carried out have a signi4cant in2uence on the nature of
12 Note that F ¿ (
√
5− 1)ga=4 implies that uu ¿B.
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the outcomes as well as on the level of social welfare. This motivates an examination
of their relative merits. In this section, we will 4rst examine the normative appeal
of the di8erent rules and then we will examine their stability. Our principal 4nding is
that the outcomes of the majority voting rule in each region supplemented with union
as the default outcome is normatively appealing as well as enforceable.
In what follows we shall refer to the two region-wide referenda with separation
as a default outcome as Rule I. We recall that outcomes under the two region-wide
referenda with union as default outcome, and the outcomes under a single nation-wide
referendum are identical. In what follows we will therefore only consider the latter
rule and we will refer to it as Rule II. In addition we will refer to the unequal union
option as Rule III.
From a normative point of view, we would like to implement the rule with outcomes
closest to the socially optimal outcome. It follows from the analysis in Section 3 and
5 that Rule II induces outcomes closest to the socially optimal outcomes. Rule II is
thus the most attractive from a normative point of view.
We now examine the stability of di8erent rules. We shall say that a voting rule is
stable if in a nation-wide vote a majority of voters prefers this rule to any other rule.
We start with a comparison between Rules I and II. First note that in all cases where
uni4cation is the outcome under Rule I it is also the outcome under Rule II. Next
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note that in cases where separation is the outcome under Rule II it is also the outcome
under Rule I. Hence, in all these cases individuals will be indi8erent between the two
rules. The interesting cases to check are therefore those in which the majority voting
outcome is union under Rule II while it is separation under Rule I. Using Propositions
3.1–3.2 and Propositions 5.1–5.2 we can deduce that this di8erence in outcomes is only
possible if a majority in the small region prefers uni4cation, while a majority in the
large region prefers separation. We next observe that all individuals located between 
and 12 will prefer uni4cation over separation since in a union they will pay less taxes
and the public good will be located closer to them. Finally, we note that if the median
voter in the small region prefers uni4cation then all other voters in the small region
also prefer uni4cation. 13 Thus the voters in the small region along with voters located
between  and 12 form a majority in favor of union and hence in favor of Rule II.
Rule II therefore dominates Rule I for these cases.
We now compare Rules II and III. From Propositions 5.1 and 5.3 we deduce that
if the outcome under Rule III is equal union then the same outcome obtains under
Rule II. Similarly, if the outcome under Rule II is separation then the same outcome
obtains under Rule III. So the only cases where the outcomes di8er are those where
there is uni4cation under Rule II while the outcome under Rule III is unequal union
or separation. There are two ways in which this can happen. In the 4rst case voters in
the small region prefer equal union over separation and separation over unequal union,
while voters in the large region prefer separation over equal union. In the second case
voters in the small region prefer equal union over unequal union and unequal union
over separation. In the 4rst case the outcome under Rule III will be separation. We
can use the same argument we have used above (in comparing Rules I and II) to show
that a majority of the individuals prefers Rule II over Rule III. In the latter case the
outcome will be unequal union under Rule III. The individuals in the small region
prefer equal union over unequal union. The individuals located between  and 12 also
prefer union over unequal union. In an equal union they will pay the same taxes as
in unequal union but they will be located closer to the government in an equal union.
Thus a majority of voters prefers Rule II to Rule III in all the cases where the outcome
di8ers.
The above arguments lead us to conclude that Rule II is enforceable for all param-
eters 14 which is not the case for the other rules under consideration.
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined incentives of regions to unite/separate in terms of a basic
trade-o8: separation allows for greater in2uence over the nature of political decision
13 If the median voter in a region prefers union over separation then all individuals in the region will have
this preference, since utility is decreasing with the same rate under union and separation with respect to
distance.
14 Our arguments above also establish that Rule II is self-stable in the sense of Barbera and Jackson (2000).
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making while uni4cation allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision
of government. We 4nd that if regions have dispersed preferences then a small region
is relatively more eager to form a union as compared to a large region. However,
the incentives of a large region to form a union are increasing with regard to cluster-
ing/concentration of preferences in the large region, while the reverse holds true for
the small region. Our analysis also identi4es the important role of regional location in
shaping preferences over uni4cation and separation.
We then explore the social welfare of decisions made on the basis of majority voting
in regions. Our main 4nding is that majority voting rules typically lead to excessive
separation. A discussion of alternative voting systems reveals that a majority voting
system supplemented with uni4cation as a default option is normatively appealing as
well as enforceable.
There are several directions in which our model can be developed further. First,
we have examined a variety of political rules and also discussed their stability. There
is another dimension to the stability question. There may be groups of persons who
are unhappy with the outcome under majority voting and they may use violent means
to have their way. This raises the question: to what extent are the outcomes robust
to attempts by the disa8ected group to secede or forcibly unite? We feel that these
issues, while clearly important, require a model in which costs of violence as well
as the technology of suppression of violence are explicitly formulated and therefore
lie outside the scope of the present paper. Second, we have assumed that the public
good/government is indivisible and has a 4xed level and cost. Typically, public goods
permit some decentralization and voters decide on the level of the public good to
some extent. Third, we have assumed that public goods have no spillovers across
regional/national boundaries. In many cases of interest, public goods have spillovers
and, moreover, these spillovers are related to the location of di8erent individuals. We
hope to explore these issues in future work.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 3.3. In the socially optimal solution the sum of all individual
utilities is maximized. If it is optimal to have just one country, then it will be socially
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optimal to choose the location of the public good and the tax level to maximize the
aggregate payo8 UI to all individuals in the union:
UI =
∫ 1
0
UI(i) di = g(1− aE(di|l)) + y − E(ti) (A.1)
and if it is optimal to form two governments then it will be socially optimal to choose
the location of the public good and the tax level to maximize the aggregate payo8 UII
to all individuals under separation:
UII =
∫ 1
0
UII(i) di =
∑
x=A;B
sx[g(1− aEx(di|lx)) + y − Ex(ti)]; (A.2)
where Ex(di|lx), sx and Ex(ti) are, respectively, the average distance in country x given
the location of the government, the size of country x and the lump sum tax level in
country x. Since the value of  is exogenously speci4ed, the values of sA and sB are
 and 1− , respectively. In order to minimize Ex(di) it is socially optimal to locate
the government in the middle of each country. Hence, EA(di), EB(di) and E(di) are,
respectively, =4, (1 − )=4 and 14 . Each country has to 4nance its own government,
therefore EA(ti), EB(ti) and E(ti) are, respectively, F=, F=(1− ) and F .
Hence, the social utility expressions (A.1) and (A.2) can be rewritten as follows:
UI = g
(
1− a
4
)
+ y − F; (A.3)
UII = 
[
g
(
1− a 
4
)]
+ (1− )
[
g
(
1− a 1− 
4
)]
+ y − 2F: (A.4)
Comparing the total utilities of uni4cation and separation determines the choice for
either uni4cation or separation. It is better to have one government (one nation) if and
only if UI¿UII:
g
(
1− a
4
)
+ y − F ¿ 
[
g
(
1− a 
4
)]
+(1− )
[
g
(
1− a 1− 
4
)]
+ y − 2F: (A.5)
After rearranging terms, this inequality can be written as
ga
2
2 − ga
2
+ F ¿ 0 (A.6)
and this is equivalent with
2 − + 2F
ga
¿ 0: (A.7)
Note that this inequality will only have solutions if F ¡ga=8 = FSP.
Inequality (A.5) is satis4ed for values of  when
¡
1
2
−
√
1
4
− 2F
ga
(A.8)
586 S. Goyal, K. Staal / European Economic Review 48 (2004) 563–593
or when
¿
1
2
+
√
1
4
− 2F
ga
: (A.9)
Note that the right hand side of inequality (A.9) is greater than 12 . Because  is, by as-
sumption, smaller than 12 , we can omit inequality (A.9). This proves
Proposition 3.3.
A.1. Formal analysis for symmetric case
A coalition C is a subset of the set of regions N = {A; B; C}. An outcome speci4es
which, if any, subset of regions unites and which of the regions remain independent.
Let S be the set of possible outcomes and let s∈S be a typical outcome in this
set. Also denote by usi the utility of the median voter in region i, under outcome s.
Likewise, let uCi be the utility that accrues to the median voter of region i, in a coalition
C. A coalition is said to block an outcome s if uCi ¿ u
s
i , for all i∈C and there is some
i∈C such that uCi ¿ usi . An outcome is said to be stable (or to lie in the core) if there
exists no blocking coalition.
We shall use the & sign to denote a union between two regions. We summarize
the results of our analysis in the following proposition. Let 1 = 12 − 12
√
1− 8F=ga,
2 = 2F=ga, 3 = 1− 2F=ga and C = 34 − 14
√
1 + 16F=ga.
Proposition A.1.
1. If 0¡F¡ 19ga then (a) for all ∈ [0; 2] the stable outcome is A&B&C; (b) for
all ∈ [2; 12 ] the stable outcome is A; B; C;
2. If 19ga¡F ¡
1
8ga then (a) for all ∈ [0; 2] the stable outcome is A&B&C; (b)
for all ∈ [2; C] the stable outcome is A; B; C; (c) for all ∈ [C; 1] the stable
outcome is either A&C; B or A; B&C; (d) for all ∈ [1; 12 ] the stable outcome is
A; B; C.
3. If 18ga¡F ¡ (
1
2− 14
√
2)ga then (a) for all ∈ [0; 2] the stable outcome is A&B&C;
(b) for all ∈ [2; C] the stable outcome is A; B; C; (c) for all ∈ [C; 12 ] the stable
outcome is either A&C; B or A; B&C.
4. If ( 12− 14
√
2)ga¡F ¡ 14ga then (a) for all ∈ [0; C] the stable outcome is A&B&C;
(b) for all ∈ [C; 2] the stable outcome is either A&C; B, A; B&C or A&B&C;
(c) for all ∈ [2; 12 ] the stable outcome is either A&B; C or A; B&C.
5. If 14ga¡F ¡
1
2ga then (a) for all ∈ [0; C] the stable outcome is A&B&C; (b)
for all ∈ [C; 3] the stable outcome is either A&C; B, A; B&C or A&B&C; (c)
for all ∈ [3; 12 ] the stable outcome is A&B&C.
6. If F ¿ 12ga then for all ∈ [0; 12 ] the stable outcome is A&B&C.
Proof. First, note that for all parameter values, the central region, region C, will prefer
a union with the two other regions over all other possibilities. Secondly, note that the
preferences over uni4cation and separation for the two regions at the endpoints of the
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interval are essentially the same. Both regions have the same size as well as a ‘similar’
location.
A majority of the individuals in the central region prefer a union with one of the
regions over independence if
UA&C
(
1
2
)
= UB&C
(
1
2
)
= g
(
1− a
2
)
+ y − F
1− 
¿ g+ y − F
1− 2 = UC
(
1
2
)
: (A.10)
That is, if ¡ 34 +
1
4
√
1 + 16F=ga or if ¿ 34 − 14
√
1 + 16F=ga. Since  has to be less
than 12 and
3
4 +
1
4
√
1 + 16F=ga¿ 12 the relevant inequality is
¿
3
4
− 1
4
√
1 +
16F
ga
= C: (A.11)
Similar comparisons of utility levels yield that a majority of the individuals in region
A (and therefore also a majority of the individuals in region B) prefer a union with
region C if
¿
1
2
− 1
2
√
1− 8F
ga
= 1: (A.12)
Note that this implies that F ¡ga=8. A majority of the individuals in region A (region
B) prefers independence over a union with the two other regions if
¿
2F
ga
= 2 (A.13)
and a union with three regions over a union with just the central region if
¿ 1− 2F
ga
= 3: (A.14)
To determine the ordering of 1, 2, 3, C and 12 we compare pairwise the six val-
ues and we get the following. For 0¡F¡ga=9, 0¡2¡1¡C ¡ 12 ¡3. For
ga=9¡F¡ga=8, 0¡2¡C ¡1¡ 12 ¡3. For ga=8¡F¡ (
1
2 − 14
√
2)ga,
0¡2¡C ¡ 12 ¡3. For (
1
2 − 14
√
2)ga¡F ¡ga=4, 0¡C ¡2¡ 12 ¡3. For
ga=4¡F¡ga=2, 0¡C ¡3¡ 12 ¡2. For F ¿ga=2, 3¡C ¡ 0¡
1
2 ¡2. The
combination of these relations, of inequalities (A.11)–(A.14), and the stability require-
ments mentioned above gives us the required result.
A.2. Formal analysis of regional incentives in asymmetric case
We shall use & to denote a union between two regions and the notation  to
denote ‘preferred under majority voting’. We summarize the results of our analysis
of majority voting in the central region C in the following proposition. We de4ne
1 = 120 +
1
2
√
1
100 + 8F=ga, 2 =
20
9 F=ga+
1
10 and 3 =
20
9 F=ga.
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Proposition A.2.
1. If 0¡F¡ 9200ga then (a) for all ∈ [ 110 ; 2], C&A  C&B  C; (b) for all
∈ [2; 1], C&A  C  C&B; (c) for all ∈ [1; 910 ], C  C&A  C&B; (d) for
all ∈ [ 910 ; 1], C  C&B  C&A.
2. If 9200ga¡F ¡
72
200ga then (a) for all ∈ [ 110 ; 3], C&B  C&A  C; (b) for all
∈ [3; 2], C&A  C&B  C; (c) for all ∈ [2; 1], C&A  C  C&B; (d) for
all ∈ [ 910 ; 1], C  C&B  C&A.
3. If 72200ga¡F ¡
81
200ga then (a) for all ∈ [ 110 ; 3], C&B  C&A  C; (b) for all
∈ [3; 910 ], C&A  C&B  C; (c) for all ∈ [ 910 ; 1], C&B  C&A  C; (d) for
all ∈ [1; 2], C&B  C  C&A; (e) for all ∈ [2; 1], C  C&B  C&A.
4. If 81200ga¡F ¡
90
200ga then (a) for all ∈ [ 110 ; 910 ], C&B  C&A  C; (b) for all
∈ [ 910 ; 3], C&A  C&B  C; (c) for all ∈ [3; 1], C&B  C&A  C; (d) for
all ∈ [1; 1], C&B  C  C&A.
5. If F ¿ 90200ga then (a) for all ∈ [ 110 ; 910 ], C&B  C&A  C; (b) for all ∈ [ 910 ; 1],
C&A  C&B  C.
Proof. A majority of the individuals in region C will prefer independence over a union
with region A if the utility of the median voter is larger under independence than in
a union with region A:
UI
(
1
20
+
1
2

)
= g+ y − F
− 1=10 ¿g
(
1− a
∣∣∣∣ 120
∣∣∣∣
)
+ y − F

=UC&A
(
1
20
+
1
2

)
: (A.15)
That is, if
2 − 1
10
− 2F
ga
¿ 0: (A.16)
This inequality is satis4ed if ¡ 120 − 12
√
100 + 8F=ga or if ¿ 120 +
1
2
√
100 + 8F=ga.
Since 120 − 12
√
100 + 8F=ga¡ 0 the relevant inequality is
¿
1
20
+
1
2
√
100 + 8F=ga= 1: (A.17)
Similar comparisons of utility levels yield that a majority of individuals in region C
will prefer independence over a union with region B if
¿
1
20
F
ga
+
1
10
= 2 (A.18)
and a union with region A over a union with region C if
¿
1
20
F
ga
= 3: (A.19)
To determine the ordering of 110 ,
9
10 , 1, 1, 2 and 3 we compare pairwise the
six values and we get the following: For 0¡F¡ 9200ga,
1
10 ¡2¡1¡
9
10 . For
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9
200 ¡F¡
72
200ga,
1
10 ¡3¡2¡1¡
9
10 . For
72
200 ¡F¡
81
200ga,
1
10 ¡3¡
9
10 ¡
1¡2¡ 1. For 81200 ¡F¡
90
200ga,
1
10 ¡3¡
9
10 ¡1¡2¡ 1. The combination of
these relations and of inequalities (A.17)–(A.19) gives us the result.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. A majority in each region in favor of separation implies that
there is a majority in the whole nation, so the proof of the if-part of the statement is
immediate. The only if-part of the statement is equivalent to: if there does not exist a
majority in favor of separation in both regions then there does not exist a majority
in favor of separation in the whole nation. There are three di8erent cases in which
there does not exist a majority in favor of separation in both regions:
Case A: There exist a majority in favor of separation in region A but not in
region B.
Case B: There exists a majority in favor of separation in region B but not in
region A.
Case C: There exists a majority in favor of separation in neither region B nor in
region A.
In case C it is straightforward to see that there does not exist a majority in favor
of separation in the whole nation.
We now take up cases A and B. The following formulae are useful in what follows:
UII
(
1
2
)
= g− 1
2
ga+ y − F
1−  ¡g+ y − F = UI
(
1
2
)
: (A.20)
From Proposition 3.1, we know that case A implies that
UII
(
1 + 
2
)
¡UI
(
1 + 
2
)
: (A.21)
We also know that
@UI(i)
@i
=−ga ∀i∈
[
1
2
; 1
]
; (A.22)
which implies that UI(i) is decreasing in i∈ [ 12 ; (1 + )=2]. Furthermore,
@UII(i)
@i
= ga ∀i∈
[
;
1 + 
2
]
; (A.23)
which implies that UII(i) is increasing in i∈ [ 12 ; (1 + )=2]. Finally, we note that,
@UII(i)
@i
=−ga ∀i∈
[
1 + 
2
; 1
]
: (A.24)
This implies that UII(i) is decreasing in i∈ [(1 + )=2; 1].
From expressions (A.21)–(A.23) it follows that UII(i)¡UI(i) for all i∈ [ 12 ; (1 +
)=2] and from expressions (A.21), (A.22) and (A.24) it follows that UII(i)¡UI(i)
for all i∈ [(1 + )=2; 1], so UII(i)¡UI(i) for all i∈ [ 12 ; 1]. Inequality (A.20) and the
continuity of the utility function in i imply that the individuals suKciently close to
1
2 prefer uni4cation. Hence, there does not exist a majority in favor of separation in
case A.
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Using Proposition 3.1, we know that case B implies that
UII
(
2
)
¡UI
(
2
)
: (A.25)
We also know that
@UI(i)
@i
= ga ∀i∈
[
0;
1
2
]
; (A.26)
which implies that UI(i) is increasing in i∈ [0; 12 ]. Furthermore,
@UII(i)
@i
= ga ∀i∈
[
0;

2
]
; (A.27)
so UII(i) is increasing in i∈ [0; =2]. We next note that
@UII(i)
@i
=−ga ∀i∈
[
2
; 
]
; (A.28)
so UII(i) is decreasing in i∈ [=2; ]. Finally, note that
@UII(i)
@i
= ga ∀i∈
[
;
+ 1
2
]
(A.29)
so UII(i) is increasing in i∈ [; 12 ].
From expressions (A.25)–(A.27) it follows that UII(i)¡UI(i) for all i∈ [0; =2],
from expressions (A.25), (A.26) and (A.28) it follows that UII(i)¡UI(i) for all
i∈ [=2; ] and from expressions (A.20), (A.26) and (A.29) it follows that UII(i)¡UI(i)
for all i∈ [; 12 ], so UII(i)¡UI(i) for all i∈ [0; 12 ]. Inequality (A.20) and the continuity
of the utility function in i imply that the individuals suKciently close to the individ-
ual located at 12 prefer uni4cation. Hence there does not exist a majority in favor of
separation in the whole nation, which proves case B.
Appendix B
It is widely argued that wealth and income di8erences are one of the main factors
behind regional movements which seek secession. One of the assumptions in the basic
model is that the initial endowment per individual is equal in both regions. To study
wealth di8erences across regions we write the initial endowment of the individuals in
region A and in region B as yA and yB, respectively. We suppose that these incomes
di8er by a factor , ¿ 0, and we write yB = yA. It can be veri4ed that wealth
di8erences do not matter when the public good is 4nanced by lump sum taxes. We
therefore change the system of taxation to proportional taxes. When both regions sep-
arate there are di8erent tax levels in each region and when there is union we have
just one tax level to 4nance the public good. One justi4cation for this assumption is
that a di8erence in tax-levels between the regions is not sustainable when the subject
of taxation (e.g. capital or labor) is mobile in a union. If there exists a tax di8erence
between the regions in a union then the capital or the labor will be located in the re-
gion with the lowest tax level. It is also possible that the legislation of a union allows
just one tax rate. This leads to three proportional tax levels: tA denotes the tax level
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under separation in region A, tB the same in region B and t denotes the proportional
tax level in a union. Recall that Proposition 3.2 tells us that there exists an A such
that region A prefers uni4cation if and only if ∈ (0; A) and there exists an B such
that region B prefers uni4cation if and only if ∈ (B; 12 ).
Proposition B.1. When  increases, A and B will increase. For ¿ 8F=(8F − ga)
region A always prefers union and for ¡ (8F − ga)=8F region B always prefers
union.
This Proposition is in line with the idea that it is more attractive to unite with a rich
region than with a poor region: An increase in  implies that the individuals in region
B become relatively richer compared to the individuals in region A. Union becomes
therefore more attractive for region A and less attractive for the individuals in region
B, which is re2ected by the increases in A and B, respectively.
Proof of Proposition B.1. Note that we can use Proposition 3.1 in this proof. We will
prove that an increase in  leads to an increase in A. The proof that an increase in 
leads to an increase in B has the same structure as in the A-case and it is therefore not
given. Recall that we restricted  to values between 0 and 12 . The utility of individual
=2 in a union is
UI
(
2
)
= g− ga
2
+
ga
2
+ yA − F(+ (1− ))yA yA (B.1)
and under separation
UII
(
2
)
= g+ yA − F : (B.2)
Let UI () and U

II() be the utility of individual =2 under union and separation,
respectively. Like in the standard model, de4ne A() as
UI ()¡U

II() for ¡A();
U I () = U

II() for = A();
U I ()¿U

II() for ¿A(): (B.3)
Hence, since UI () and U

II() are di8erentiable in  for ∈ (0; 12 ),
@[UI (A())− UII(A())]
@
¡ 0: (B.4)
Next note that at A(), UI (())− UII(()) = 0. Hence,
@[UI(A())− UII(A())]
@
d+
@[UI(A())− UII(A())]
@
d= 0: (B.5)
This implies that
dA()
d
=
−@[UI (A())− UII(A())]=@
@[UI (A())− UII(A())]=@
: (B.6)
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Note that @UII(A())=@= 0,
@UI ()
@
=
F(1− )
(+ (1− ))2 ¿ 0 (B.7)
and recall that
@[UI (A())− UII(A())]
@
¡ 0: (B.8)
Hence dA()=d¿ 0. This completes the proof.
Proposition B.2. The socially desirable outcome does not change when the endow-
ments across regions vary.
Proof. In a social optimum the sum of all individual utilities is maximized. The utility
under union is
UI =
∫ 1
0
UI(i) di =
∑
x=A;B
sx[g(1− aE(di|l)) + yx − txyx]: (B.9)
This implies that
UI = g(1− aE(di|l)) + y −
∑
x=A;B
sxtxyx = g
(
1− a
4
)
+ y − F: (B.10)
The utility under separation is
UII =
∫ 1
0
UII(i) di =
∑
x=A;B
sx[g(1− aE(di|l)) + yx − txyx]: (B.11)
So total utility under separation can be written as
UII = 
[
g
(
1− a 
4
)]
+ (1− )
[
g
(
1− a 1− 
4
)]
+ y − 2F: (B.12)
These utilities are equal to the utilities of equations 16 and 17. We can therefore apply
the same analysis as in the standard model.
This Proposition implies that di8erences in initial endowments across regions are
irrelevant for the socially optimal outcome in which aggregate utility is maximized.
Moreover, the possibility of choosing di8erent taxation systems for compensation or
for wealth transfers does not in2uence the socially desirable outcome.
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